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15. PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS 
TO THE LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS OF THE 2013 CAP 
REFORM 
IMRE FERTŐ AND ATTILA KOVACS 
he role of the European Parliament in the decision-making 
and legislation of the European Union has long been a subject 
of analysis in political science. A considerable part of this 
research agenda measures the relative power of the Parliament 
compared to the other two EU institutions that take part in EU 
legislation – the European Commission (EC) and the Council – (Hix, 
2002; Selck & Steunenberg, 2004; Greer et al., 2012), while others 
measure the power of the Parliament under different – consultation, 
cooperation, co-decision – legislative procedures (Earnshaw & 
Judge, 1997; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Kreppel, 2002). 
Treaties in recent decades have significantly changed the 
institutional balance in the decision-making procedures of the EU 
as well as the role and power of EU institutions in EU legislation. 
The Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of 
Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon were the key milestones in this 
process. The most important institutional change was the Treaty of 
Maastricht in 1993, which introduced the co-decision procedure that 
made the Parliament a co-legislator, and the Treaty of Lisbon, which 
entered into force in 2009 and largely extended the scope of the 
policy domains falling under the co-decision procedure. 
Research was more intensive in the 1990s, when subsequent 
EU treaties reshaped the EU political landscape and attracted much 
scientific attention to this topic (Tsebelis, 1994; Scully, 1997; 
Crombez, 1997; Kreppel, 1999). Although the Treaty of Lisbon 
marks a key milestone in the evolution of the EU’s inter-institutional 
T
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setup, no extensive empirical research has been done on the impact 
of the Treaty of Lisbon on EU-level decision-making and, most 
concretely, on the legislative power of the EP.  
The aim of this chapter is to analyse how the entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon changed the influence and power of the 
Parliament in the common agricultural policy (CAP). More 
specifically we focus on the legislative influence of the Parliament, 
which increased owing to the changing in legislative procedure 
from consultation to co-decision, using the 2013 CAP reform as a 
case study.  
We compare the legislative instruments of the CAP of two 
consecutive EU programming periods, 2007-13 and 2014-20. The 
chapter is organised as follows. First, we provide a brief literature 
review on the role of the Parliament in legislative procedures. Then 
we describe the dataset, introduce our methodology and present 
our results. In the final section we conclude. 
1. Literature review on the Parliament’s role  
The European Parliament in its resolution stressed that the Treaty 
of Maastricht has major shortcomings because it “does not provide 
a real co-decision procedure, which would have meant that the 
Parliament and the Council would have had the same decision-
making powers over any legislative act, since the Council is allowed 
to act unilaterally in the absence of an agreement with the 
Parliament, and also applies this procedure only to a limited area” 
(IGC, 1992, Point 2. (c)). 
Steunenberg (1994) argues that the co-decision procedure 
does not really improve the Parliament’s position and it didn’t 
increase its power. In his opinion, under the co-decision procedure 
– similar to the consultation and cooperation procedures – the 
Commission is the most influential EU institution. Tsebelis (1995) 
and Tsebelis et al. (2001) state that at the end of the co-decision 
procedure, the Council can make a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ offer to the 
Parliament. It gives the Council the agenda-setting power, which 
earlier belonged to the Parliament. Therefore, under co-decision, the 
Parliament’s power is decreased owing to the loss of its agenda-
setting power. Crombez (2000) points out that the co-decision 
procedure weakens the influence of the Commission, which may 
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weaken the power of the Parliament as well. It is because the policy 
position of the Parliament is generally closer to that of the 
Commission: representing EU-level interests contrary to national 
positions of the member states represented in the Council. Apart 
from the general influence of the Parliament, Neuhold (2001) and 
Yordanova (2010) analysed the role and legislative power of 
Parliament committees. They found the committees exert a huge 
impact on the legislative outcome. 
However, there is increasing research with opposite 
conclusions, namely that the Parliament gained significant power 
via the introduction and extension of the co-decision procedure. In 
many of its resolutions – IGC (1992); Parliament (1995); Parliament 
(2008) – the Parliament defined itself as an equal co-legislator with 
the Council under co-decision. The main conclusions of the related 
articles are summarised in Table 15.1.  
The previous research also raises an important question for 
empirical analysis: How can we measure the impact of the 
Parliament on legislative procedures? One of the simplest answers 
is to calculate the success rate of amendments. However, there are 
conflicting views of the applicability of the ratio of adopted 
Parliament amendments as an indicator of Parliament’s legislative 
power. Some papers argue that these success rates do not provide a 
well-founded argument to describe its legislative influence (Tsebelis 
et al., 2001; Shackleton, 1999). They claim that simple success rates 
do not give any information regarding the importance or weight of 
the Parliament amendment concerned. Tsebelis et al. (2001:576) 
point out that “counting success of amendments may not mean very 
much about the influence of different actors”. Shackleton (1999:5) 
also says, “[N]umbers [of successful amendments] alone do not 
offer an adequate view of the impact of the Parliament”.  
However, the majority of research analysing the Parliament’s 
amendments (Kreppel, 1999; Tsebelis & Kalandrakis, 1999; Kreppel, 
2002; Tsebelis et al., 2001; Lucic, 2004) justifies measuring the role 
and influence of the Parliament via the success rates of adopted 
Parliament amendments as well as the variables attributed to the 
amendments. The main research question of these analyses is what 
factors influence the adoption of Parliament amendments. The 
major findings are summarised in Table 15.2. 
  
382 
 E
U
R
O
P
E
A
N
 P
A
R
L
IA
M
E
N
T
A
R
Y
 A
M
E
N
D
M
E
N
T
S
 T
O
 T
H
E
 2013
 C
A
P
 R
E
F
O
R
M
 
Table 15.1 The role, influence and power of the European Parliament (EP) in the consultation and co-decision procedures 
(conclusions in italics show the minority positions of authors) 
Summary of the main conclusions of relevant articles 
Consultation procedure Co-decision procedure 
Article Main conclusion Article Main conclusion 
Westlake (1994) 
The EP does not have a real 
legislative power. 
Steunenberg 
(1994) 
The introduction of the co-decision procedure did not 
increase the legislative power of the EP. 
Tsebelis (1995) 
The agenda-setting power of the EP decreases in the co-
decision procedure. 
Crombez (2000) 
The power of the EP can decrease under the co-decision 
procedure. 
Crombez (1996) The influence of the EP is weak. 
Corbett et al. 
(1995) 
The adoption rates of EP amendments are higher 
under the co-decision procedure.  
Crombez 
(1997) 
The EP became an equal co-legislator with the 
Council. The EP has more legislative power under co-
decision compared to consultation. 
Tsebelis & 
Garrett (2001) 
The legislative influence of the EP is 
minimal: the only way for the EP to 
influence the legislation is to delay it. 
Jacobs (1997) 
Under the co-decision procedure, the rejection rates of 
EP amendments are lower than in any other EU 
legislative procedure. 
Laruelle (2002) 
The EP plays a minor role under the 
consultation procedure. 
Scully (1997) 
The co-decision procedure increases the legislative 
influence of the EP and the MEPs. 
Lucic (2004) 
The role of the EP is modest and 
limited. 
Steunenberg 
(1998) 
In the co-decision procedure, the final political 
outcome is closer to the ideal policy of the EP. 
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Shackleton 
(1999) 
Under the co-decision procedure, the Council cannot 
hinder the EP to influence the legislation significantly, 
therefore, the power of EP increases. 
Jupille (2004) 
The consultation procedure is an 
interaction between the European 
Commission and the Council: the role 
of the EP is marginal. 
Tsebelis et al. 
(2001) 
The adoption rates of EP amendments are higher 
under co-decision than any other EU legislative 
procedure. 
Thomson et al. 
(2006) 
Negative opinion on the role of the 
EP under the consultation procedure. 
Tsebelis & 
Garrett (2001) 
The EP became an equal co-legislator with the 
Council under co-decision. 
Kardasheva 
(2009) 
The EP's power in the consultation 
procedure is very limited.  
Hix (2002) 
The Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of 
Amsterdam increased the power of the EP. 
Selck & 
Steunenberg 
(2004)  
The policy position of the EP is closer to 
the political outcome under the 
consultation procedure than under the co-
decision procedure. 
Selck & 
Steunenberg 
(2004) 
The EP can be considered a real co-legislator.  
Thomson et al. 
(2006) 
The EP managed to increase its power during the 
transition from consultation to co-decision.  
Jupille (2007) 
The introduction of the co-decision procedure 
resulted in the enhancement of the legislative power 
of the EP.  
Source: Own composition. 
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Table 15.2 Factors increasing the adoption of the amendments of the European Parliament (EP) 
Summary of conclusions of relevant articles 
Article Cooperation procedure Consultation procedure Co-decision procedure 
Kreppel (1999) 
First reading amendments 
  
  
Clarification amendments 
Recital amendments 
Internal unity of EP behind the 
amendment 
Tsebelis & 
Kalandrakis (1999) 
First reading amendments 
Lucic (2004) 
First reading amendments 
Non-policy amendments (less 
important amendments) 
Kardasheva (2009)   
The European Commission supports the 
EP amendment. 
The legislative proposal is of outstanding 
importance.  
The EP can link the legislative proposal to 
a co-decision legislative file. 
The amendment is tabled to a legislative 
proposal in the field of human rights. 
The legislative proposal is urgent. 
Tsebelis et al. (2001) 
The European Commission 
supports the EP amendment. 
  
The European Commission supports the 
EP amendment. 
Shackleton (1999)   
The adoption rates of EP amendments 
tabled in a compromise form are higher. 
Source: Own composition. 
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Although there is a wealth of literature on CAP reform, the 
role and legislative influence of the Parliament in the formulation of 
CAP has not yet been extensively analysed.  
Crombez & Swinnen (2011:23) evaluate the implications of the 
adoption of co-decision on CAP reform. They focus on the 
Parliament’s role in CAP legislation. In their paper they compare 
the consultation and co-decision procedures. Their conclusion is 
that “the move from the consultation to the co-decision procedure 
has led to a redistribution of formal legislative powers between the 
Commission and the EP.” They claim that with this legislative 
change, the “EP gains legislative influence over the policy 
outcome”. 
Swinnen & Knops (2012) analyse the Parliament’s role in the 
2013 CAP reform under the co-decision procedure. They claim that 
until the Parliament has significant capacities – primarily a staff 
with significant expertise – similar to the Commission’s and the 
Council’s, it will not be able to act as a real co-legislator. The lack of 
capacity and resources as well as the lack of traditions in the 
technical level working culture with the other two EU institutions 
jeopardise the Parliament’s ability to enforce its position during the 
2013 CAP reform. 
Roederer-Rynning et al. (2012) examine the circumstances 
under which the co-decision procedure has been extended to the 
CAP. In their paper they share the view that the Treaty of Lisbon 
increased the Parliament’s power both in budgetary and legislative 
terms.  
Greer et al. (2012) investigate the inter-institutional 
relationships of the three EU institutions in the field of the CAP. 
They claim that even after the introduction of the co-decision 
procedure, the Council remains the primary legislator in the CAP. 
Nevertheless, the Commission – mostly thanks to the high-level 
professional knowledge of its staff – maintains its influential role in 
the formulation of CAP legislation. Under the co-decision 
procedure, the Parliament will only gradually become an equal co-
legislator with the Council.  
These papers share the view that the Parliament became more 
powerful in the CAP legislative procedure after the Treaty of 
Lisbon; however, mostly due to capacity constraints, the Parliament 
is not yet an equal co-legislator with the Council. 
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2. Dataset 
The research is based on a newly elaborated dataset, which contains 
Parliament amendments tabled to eight legislative proposals related 
to the CAP. Most of these legislative proposals were in the EU 
legislative packages for the seven-year multiannual financial 
framework (MFF): four proposals relate to the 2007-13 MFF, another 
four relate to the 2014-20 MFF. These legislative instruments are the 
most important in the CAP as they define the rules for the use of the 
CAP budget for a seven-year EU programming period. These four 
regulations are the Direct Payment (DP) Regulation, the European 
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) Regulation, the 
Single Common Market Organisation (SCMO) Regulation and the 
Horizontal Regulation. 
The two consecutive EU programming periods also reflect 
two legislative procedures: the four regulations concerning the 
2007-13 term were adopted under the consultation procedure, and 
the four regulations relating to the 2014-20 period were adopted 
under the co-decision procedure. 
Table 15.3 The analysed legislative instruments of the CAP 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Regulation 
Consultation 
procedure 
Co-decision 
procedure 
2007-13 2014-20 
Direct Payment 
Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 73/2009 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1307/2013 
EAFRD Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1698/2005 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1305/2013 
SCMO Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1234/2007 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1308/2013 
Horizontal Regulation 
Council Regulation 
(EC) No 1290/2005 
Regulation (EU) 
No 1306/2013 
Source: Own composition. 
In order to get a better understanding of the Parliament’s role 
in the 2013 CAP reform, it is necessary to have an overview of the 
steps of the legislative procedure with a focus on the intra-
Parliament phases of the process. 
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Figure 15.1 Legislative procedure in the 2013 CAP reform 
 
Source: Own composition. 
14. The Council adopts the final regulation
8. The rapporteur elaborates the compromise amendments 
9. Voting in the responsible EP committee (COMAGRI) on the 
draft report, open, compromise and OGC amendments - the 
Report of the committee is finalised
10. The COMAGRI, any EP groups or 40+ MEPs can table 
plenary amendments
11. The EP plenary votes on the COMAGRI Report - on the 
amendments in it - and on the plenary amendments: this is the 
negotiation mandate of the EP towards the Council
12. The EP enters into negotiations with the Council in order to 
finalise the text of the legislation (the representatives of the 
European Commission and the rotating EU presidency also take 
part in the negotiation rounds)
13. Once an agreement is reached with the Council, the EP 
adopts the final regulation 
The ordinary legislative procedure
1. European Commission tables its legislative proposal and 
submits it to the EP
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2. Designation of the responsible EP committee (COMAGRI)
3. Designation of the opinion-giving EP committees
4. Designation of the rapporteur of the file
5. Elaboration of the draft report by the rapporteur 
6. Opinion-giving committees send their opinions to the 
responsible EP committee (OGC amendments)
7. Any MEPs can table amendments to the legislative proposal 
(open amendments)
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Regarding the 2007-13 EU programming period – under the 
consultation procedure –steps 1-11 (Figure 15.1) were the same for 
the CAP legislative process. But unlike the co-decision procedure, 
the Parliament did not enter into negotiations with the Council in 
the consultation procedure: the Council decided on the Parliament 
amendments without the involvement of the Parliament. 
Regarding each legislative instrument in Table 15.3, all the 
amendments tabled in the Parliament by any MEPs at any stage of 
the legislative procedure have been merged into the dataset. 
Amendments in this context mean textual amendments tabled to the 
original text of the legislative proposal highlighted by track 
changes.  
The total number of Parliament amendments tabled to the 
eight legislative proposals is detailed in Table 15.4. 
Table 15.4 The number and share of EP amendments tabled to the CAP 
legislative proposals 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Regulation 
Consultation 
procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP Reform 
Number of 
amendments % 
Number of 
amendments % 
Direct Payment Regulation 931 62.9 2,567 29.8 
EAFRD Regulation 426 28.8 2,471 28.7 
SCMO Regulation 98 6.6 2,596 30.2 
Horizontal Regulation 25 1.7 972 11.3 
Total 1,480 100 8,606 100 
Source: Own composition. 
Table 15.4 shows 30.2% of all amendments have been tabled 
to the Single CMO Regulation, followed by the Direct Payment 
Regulation (29.8%) and the EAFRD (28.7%), while only 11.3% of all 
amendments have been proposed to the Horizontal Regulation.  
Depending on the phase of the legislative procedure within 
the Parliament, in which the amendments were tabled, another 
categorisation of the amendments is also possible per Table 15.5. 
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Table 15.5 The number of EP amendments tabled to the CAP legislative 
proposals by type 
Type of amendment 
Consultation 
procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
Number of 
amendments % 
Number of 
amendments % 
Draft report amendments 185 12.5 711 8.3 
Open amendments 1,063 71.8 6,749 78.4 
OGC amendments 128 8.7 533 6.2 
Compromise amendments 45 3 279 3.2 
Oral amendments 3 0.2 0 0 
Plenary amendments 56 3.8 334 3.9 
Total 1,480 100 8,606 100 
Source: Own composition. 
Draft Report amendments are tabled by the rapporteur of the 
file as the initial phase of the legislative procedure in the Parliament. 
Then, any MEPs can propose amendments to the legislative 
instrument. These are the so-called open amendments. Besides the 
Parliament committee, which is responsible for elaborating the 
Parliament report – in case of the CAP, it is COMAGRI – other 
Parliament committees also have the possibility to express their 
opinions on the legislative proposals. These opinions mostly take 
the form of textual amendments, which are now called the 
‘amendments of opinion-giving committees’ (OGC amendments). 
Besides the vote in COMAGRI, the rapporteur of the file forms 
compromise amendments. These compromise amendments are 
mostly the combination of previously tabled draft report, open and 
OGC amendments. Oral amendments can be tabled by COMAGRI 
members just before the vote on the file in the COMAGRI meeting. 
After the COMAGRI vote, the file is tabled to the forthcoming 
Parliament plenary session. Before the plenary session, only 
COMAGRI, Parliament groups or a group of more than 40 MEPs 
jointly have the opportunity to propose plenary amendments. This 
categorisation of Parliament amendments makes it possible to 
calculate adoption rates of Parliament amendments of any type at 
any stage of intra-Parliament decision-making.  
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There are three stages of the legislative procedure: the first 
stage is the vote of COMAGRI on Parliament legislative 
amendments. The second stage is the decision of the Parliament 
plenary, and the last stage is the final joint decision of the Parliament 
and Council on whether the amendments are incorporated in the 
text of the final regulations. 
Table 15.7 contains the analysed Parliament amendments 
grouped both by amendment type and CAP regulation. 
As for the ‘draft report’ amendments, most (61%) have been 
tabled to the Single CMO Regulation, followed by the Horizontal 
Regulation, the Direct Payment Regulation and the EAFRD 
Regulation. Regarding the ‘open amendments’, most (32.4%) have 
been tabled to the DP Regulation, followed by the EAFRD, the 
Single CMO and the Horizontal Regulation. Most of the 
compromise amendments (63.1%) were proposed to the Single 
CMO Regulation; only 13.6% to the EAFRD and 13.6% to the Direct 
Payment Regulation; and 9.7% to the Horizontal Regulation. 
Concerning the amendments of opinion-giving committees, 49.5% 
were proposed to the EAFRD Regulation, followed by the Direct 
Payment Regulation (26.3%), the Horizontal Regulation (18%) and 
the Single CMO Regulation (6.2%). As for plenary amendments, 
47.9% were proposed to the Single CMO Regulation, followed by 
the Direct Payment Regulation (29.9%), the EAFRD Regulation 
(12.3%) and the Horizontal Regulation (9.9%). 
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Table 15.6 The distribution of EP amendments (in %) 
 
 Consultation procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
 
Total - 
initial phase 
COMAGRI- 
adopted 
Plenary- 
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
Total - 
initial 
phase 
COMAGRI- 
adopted 
Plenary- 
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
Draft report amendments 12.5 21.4 20.8 16.7 8.3 36.6 36.9 37 
Open amendments 71.8 71.5 69.7 77.8 78.4 58.3 56.5 58.1 
Compromise amendments 3 1 1 1.4 3.2 1.4 1.4 1.2 
OGC amendments 8.6 5.5 4.4 1.4 6.2 3.7 3.7 2.6 
Oral amendment 
(COMAGRI) 
0.2 0.6 0.6 1.4 0 0 0 0 
Plenary amendments 3.9 0 3.5 1.3 3.9 0 1.5 1.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 15.7 The number and distribution of the proposed EP amendments by CAP regulation and amendment type 
 
  DP EAFRD HR SCMO Total 
Draft report amendment 
Number 102 73 102 434 711 
% 14.3 10.3 14.3 61 100 
Open amendments 
Number 2,187 2,055 714 1,793 6,749 
% 32.4 30.4 10.6 26.6 100 
Compromise amendments 
Number 38 38 27 176 279 
% 13.6 13.6 9.7 63.1 100 
OGC amendments 
Number 140 264 96 33 533 
% 26.3 49.5 18 6.2 100 
Plenary amendments 
Number 100 41 33 160 334 
% 29.9 12.3 9.9 47.9 100 
Total 
Number 2,567 2,471 972 2,596 8,606 
% 29.8 28.7 11.3 30.2 100 
Source: Own calculations. 
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3. Methodology 
In the amendment analysis, we applied the following definitions for 
the categorisation of Parliament amendments: 
- Agricultural policy amendments are those that are not 
institutional amendments.  
- CAP reform amendments are defined as those tabled to the 
new CAP reform items such as greening, young farmers 
scheme, small farmers scheme, etc., also when the 
Parliament’s position is a step back from the Commission 
proposal, i.e. amendments which aim at decreasing the 
ambitions of the Commission proposal, most often in the form 
of a more incremental introduction of certain measures. 
- Institutional amendments relate to the institutional and legal 
aspects of decision-making (comitology, delegated acts, 
implementing acts, delegated powers, etc.). 
- Compromise amendments are tabled by the rapporteur in a 
compromise format. Unless otherwise stated, in this chapter 
extracted compromise amendments are used. Extraction in 
this context refers to the methodology, when amendments 
“behind” one compromise amendment are taken into 
consideration (in official texts it is referred to as “Compromise 
amendment replacing amendment X, Y, Z.”) If one 
compromise amendment is adopted, the amendments 
replaced are also considered to be adopted. When two or 
more compromise amendments replace the same original – 
draft report, open or OGC – amendments, the number of draft 
report, open or OGC amendments is multiplied when 
calculating amendment success rates. This methodology 
makes it possible to apply a more sophisticated approach and 
to analyse some of the underlying tendencies in Parliament 
decision-making. Extracted compromise amendments also 
give a better picture on the role and influence of Parliament 
amendments. However, it should be noted that not all the 
compromise amendments are the combination of previous – 
draft report, open or OGC – amendments. These compromise 
amendments cannot be extracted and are analysed in their 
original form. 
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- Among the amendments in the Parliament negotiating 
mandate there are some – non-compromise – amendments, 
which encompass previous amendments, but not in a 
compromise form. When analysing amendment success rates 
during the Parliament internal decision-making, these 
amendments are also extracted. This is the reason – in some 
cases – for the seemingly contradictory figures between the 
calculation of thematic success rates and the success rates in 
the Parliament’s internal decision-making. 
- When analysing the amendments tabled by the OGCs, only 
amendments stipulated in the final committee opinion had 
been taken into account (no draft opinion amendments, etc.). 
In the amendment analysis, we considered a Parliament 
amendment adopted if at least part of it was adopted by COMAGRI 
or Parliament plenary or built into the final regulation. 
In this chapter, the word “co-decision” always reflects the 
“ordinary legislative procedure” as stipulated in the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
4. Analysis 
4.1 The increased role of the Parliament vis-à-vis 
the Council 
The legislative power of the Parliament is best reflected by its ability 
to influence the final policy outcome during the negotiations with 
the Council. Nevertheless, it is also worth seeing the internal 
evolution of decision-making in the Parliament. Table 15.8 contains 
the success rates of amendments in each of the three phases of 
decision-making. The final column shows what percentage of the 
total number of Parliament amendments was finally adopted by the 
Council and incorporated in the final regulations. 
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Table 15.8 The success rates of EP amendments by CAP regulation (% of 
adopted amendments compared to total) 
 Consultation procedure 2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
 
COMAGRI-
adopted 
Plenary-
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
COMAGRI-
adopted 
Plenary-
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
Direct 
Payment 
Regulation 
30.2 30.3 9.2 5.4 5 3 
EAFRD 
Regulation 
36.9 36.6 11.5 18.6 18.6 13.6 
Horizontal 
Regulation 
28 28 16 32.4 30 12.4 
SCMO 
Regulation 
51 51 5.1 23.7 23.7 13.6 
Total 33.4 33.4 9.7 17.7 17.4 10.3 
Source: Own calculations. 
In the 2013 CAP reform, 17.7% of Parliament amendments 
were adopted by COMAGRI and 17.4% by the plenary, while 10.3% 
of all amendments were incorporated in the final regulations. Under 
the consultation procedure 9.7% of all amendments were 
incorporated in the final regulations, thus there was a slight increase 
in the Parliament’s power under co-decision. However, absolute 
figures show a more striking difference between the two legislative 
procedures: an approximate 10% under consultation means 140 
adopted Parliament amendments, while 10% under co-decision 
covers 860 adopted amendments. 
For the Direct Payments Regulation, the COMAGRI adopted 
5.4% of the amendments and the Parliament plenary adopted 5%, 
while 3% of all DP amendments were adopted in the end legislation 
and can be found in the final DP Regulation. In case of the EAFRD 
Regulation, both COMAGRI and the Parliament plenary adopted 
18.6% of the amendments; 13.6% of the amendments are 
incorporated in the final regulation. Regarding the SCMO 
Regulation, both COMAGRI and the Parliament plenary adopted 
23.7% of the amendments; 13.6% of the amendments are 
incorporated in the final regulation. Concerning the Horizontal 
Regulation, 32.4% of all amendments have been adopted by 
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COMAGRI and 30% by the Parliament plenary, while 12.4% of the 
amendments were incorporated in the final regulation.  
We can conclude that the Direct Payment Regulation has the 
lowest level of amendments adopted at all levels (COMAGRI, 
Parliament plenary, and final regulation). The Horizontal 
Regulation has the highest level of adoption within the Parliament 
followed by the SCMO Regulation. The adoption ratio of 
amendments in each of the final SCMO and EAFRD Regulations 
equals 13.6%.  
Table 15.9 contains the ratios of final incorporated Parliament 
amendments to the number of Parliament amendments in the 
Parliament negotiation mandate with the Council. These success 
rates of Parliament amendments, which show the power of the 
Parliament vis-à-vis the Council, are broken down by amendment 
type and CAP regulation. The main conclusion of this part of the 
analysis is that for the four CAP regulations, 59.2% of those adopted 
by the Parliament plenary were finally built into the final CAP 
regulations. This ratio is 60.2% for the Direct Payment Regulation, 
57.1% for the SCMO Regulation and 73% for the EAFRD. In the 
Parliament negotiation mandate 41.4% of the amendments can be 
found in the final Horizontal Regulation. So we can conclude that 
the Parliament managed to make almost 60% of the amendments in 
its position (Parliament plenary adopted amendments) adopted by 
the Council during the trilogue negotiations. It shows a significant 
increase under the co-decision procedure compared to the 
consultation procedure: this figure is practically doubled (29.1% 
under the consultation procedure). 
As for draft report amendments, 59.3% of the Parliament 
plenary adopted amendments – amendments in the Parliament 
negotiation mandate – were adopted after the trilogue negotiations 
and finally built into the final regulations. This ratio is 60.8% for 
open amendments, 66.3% for compromise amendments, 41.8% for 
the amendments of opinion-giving committees and 43.5% for 
plenary amendments. 
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Table 15.9 Success rates in the trilogue negotiations by amendment type 
and CAP regulation 
EP amendments in the final regulation compared to EP plenary-adopted (in %) 
Amendment 
type 
Regulations 
Consultation 
procedure 2007-13 
2013 CAP 
reform 
Draft report 
amendments 
DP 19.7 65.8 
EAFRD 41.2 80.3 
HR 50 42.1 
SCMO 16.7 59.7 
Total 23.3 59.3 
Open 
amendments 
DP 36.2 61.3 
EAFRD 32.2 74.2 
HR 75 40 
SCMO 3.3 55.6 
Total 32.5 60.8 
Compromise 
amendments* 
DP 7.3 68.6 
EAFRD 50 72.2 
HR n/a 44 
SCMO n/a 67.9 
Total 11.1 66.3 
OGC 
amendments 
DP 0 100 
EAFRD 11.1 48.3 
HR 0 40 
SCMO n/a 0 
Total 9.1 41.8 
Plenary 
amendments 
DP 13.3 25 
EAFRD 0 44.4 
HR n/a 71.4 
SCMO n/a 0 
Total 11.8 43.5 
Total 
DP 30.5 60.2 
EAFRD 31.4 73 
HR 57.1 41.4 
SCMO 10 57.1 
Total 29.1 59.2 
*All types of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise 
amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based 
on their original figures (non-extracted).  
Source: Own calculations. 
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Box 15.1 Policy amendments 
In the framework of the amendment analysis, we also categorised the 
amendments in the Parliament negotiation mandate by policy type. 
The results show that agricultural policy amendments in the four 
CAP regulations have been adopted by the Council at an above-
average rate (51.2%). With this rate of acceptance, we can conclude 
that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with the Council, i.e. 
if one player in a two-player decision-making process manages to 
make more than 50% of its positions adopted by the other, it can be 
considered to be a decision-maker on equal footing. The higher 
adoption rate was in the case of the EAFRD Regulation (57%), while 
the lowest was in the case of the Horizontal Regulation (40.2%). 
Table 15.10 Success rates of agricultural policy amendments 
EP amendments in the final regulations compared to EP negotiation mandate (in %) 
 
Direct 
Payments 
Regulation 
EAFRD 
Regulation 
SCMO 
Regulation 
Horizontal 
Regulation 
Total 
Total number of 
amendments 
39.8 47.2 47.3 37.1 43.8 
Agricultural Policy 
amendments 
49.2 57 54.7 40.2 51.2 
CAP reform 
amendments 
48.8 65.7 52.4 60 56 
Source: Own calculations. 
Calculation based on non-extracted compromise amendments. 
As for “CAP reform amendments”, 56% of these amendments 
in the Parliament negotiation mandate were finally adopted by the 
Council. The highest acceptance rate was in the case of the EAFRD 
Regulation (65.7%), while the lowest was in the case of the Direct 
Payment Regulation (48.8%). 
 
In sum, our major findings are as follows. First, regarding all 
types of amendments, these ratios show significant increase 
compared to the consultation procedure. Second, the Parliament 
appears to be the most powerful vis-à-vis the Council concerning 
compromise amendments (66.3% success rate). The high success 
rates of both the compromise and the draft report amendments 
highlight the key role of rapporteurs. Third, amendments of 
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opinion-giving committees and plenary amendments have the 
lowest levels of success (41.8% and 43.5%, respectively), which 
might mean that these types of amendments had limited influence 
on the final policy outcome. Finally, more than 50% of the 
agricultural policy amendments and the CAP reform amendments 
in the Parliament negotiation mandate were incorporated in the 
final regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal 
partner with the Council during the trilogue negotiations. 
4.2 The role of Parliament rapporteurs 
There were three Parliament rapporteurs for the four CAP 
legislative proposals in the 2013 CAP reform: Luis Manuel Capoulas 
Santos for the Direct Payment and EAFRD Regulations, Michel 
Dantin for the SCMO Regulation and Giovanni La Via for the 
Horizontal Regulation. 
When making an amendment analysis in order to see the role 
of the rapporteurs, draft report and compromise amendments form 
the basis of analysis. In sum, the rapporteurs tabled 711 
amendments in their draft reports to the four CAP regulations, 
which is 8.3% of the total number of amendments. Additionally, 
rapporteurs tabled 279 compromise amendments during the 
legislative procedure, which is 3.2% of the total number of 
amendments. 
The influential role of the rapporteurs has already been 
highlighted in the analysis in Table 15.9. High adoption rates of 
draft report and compromise amendments show that rapporteurs 
had significant legislative influence during the 2013 CAP reform.  
When analysing the Parliament-Council relationship, we can 
see that almost two-thirds of the compromise amendments adopted 
by the Parliament plenary was finally incorporated in the four CAP 
final regulations. This ratio is 72.2% for EAFRD, 68.6% for Direct 
Payments, 67.9% for SCMO and 44% for the Horizontal Regulation. 
Regarding draft report amendments, the power of the Parliament 
vis-à-vis the Council as co-legislator is reflected in adoption rates for 
EAFRD (80.3%), Direct Payments (65.8%), SCMO (59.7%) and 
Horizontal Regulation (42.1%). Nevertheless, it is important to note 
here that high adoption rates of draft report and compromise 
amendments do not necessarily reflect the high personal legislative 
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influence of the rapporteurs, although they show the ability of the 
rapporteurs to build strong political consensus and backing behind 
these amendments.  
Based on the above figures we can draw the conclusion that 
the Parliament could most effectively defend its position during the 
trilogue negotiations over EAFRD. In this sense, the EAFRD and 
Direct Payments Parliament rapporteur (Capoulas Santos) and his 
negotiating team were the strongest during the trilogue 
negotiations, followed by Michel Dantin.  
When comparing the adopted draft report and compromise 
amendments to the total number of amendments we can see that 
78.6% of the draft report amendments were adopted by COMAGRI, 
and 77.5% by the Parliament plenary in March 2013; therefore, 46% 
of the draft report amendments – either solely or in a form of a 
compromise amendment – were integrated in the final regulations. 
These figures show that rapporteurs appear to have significant 
power in internal Parliament decision-making, and that draft report 
amendments are powerful. 
Table 15.11 The success rates of draft report and compromise 
amendments 
Adopted EP amendments compared to total (in %) 
  
COMAGRI-
adopted 
Plenary-
adopted 
Final 
regulation 
Draft report 
amendments 
DP 42.2 37.3 24.5 
EAFRD 83.6 83.6 67.1 
HR 96.1 93.1 39.2 
SCMO 82.3 82.3 49.1 
Total 78.6 77.5 46 
Compromise 
amendments 
DP 97.4 92.1 63.2 
EAFRD 94.7 94.7 68.4 
HR 100 92.6 40.7 
SCMO 92 92 62.5 
Total 93.9 92.5 61.3 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Regarding the draft report amendments, the highest adoption 
rates within the Parliament can be observed in the case of the 
Horizontal Regulation and the lowest in the case of the Direct 
Payment Regulation. Based on this, La Via can be considered the 
strongest rapporteur within the Parliament.  
When analysing the amendments in the final regulations, the 
Parliament was strongest concerning the EAFRD Regulation 
(67.1%) followed by the SCMO Regulation (49.1%). Based on this, 
Capoulas Santos and Michel Dantin can be considered the strongest 
rapporteurs. However, it should be noted that Capoulas Santos was 
weakest concerning the Direct Payment Regulation. 
 
Box 15.2 Compromise amendments 
If compromise amendments are not extracted, the following key 
pattern can be observed. For the four CAP regulations, there were 
279 compromise amendments, 93.9% of which were adopted by 
COMAGRI, 92.5% by the Parliament plenary – being part of the 
Parliament’s negotiation mandate – and 61.3% were adopted after 
the trilogue negotiations. Regarding the trilogue negotiations, the 
success rate is 68.4% for the EAFRD, 63.2% for the Direct Payment, 
62.5% for SCMO and 40.7% for the Horizontal Regulation. These 
adoption rates are the highest compared to any kind of amendment 
categories. As almost two-thirds of the compromise amendments can 
be found in the final CAP regulations, we can conclude that 
rapporteurs were powerful as they managed to formulate 
compromise amendments that have strong political support behind 
them. 
It shall be also noted that in the Parliament plenary, 63.9% of 
the draft report amendments were adopted in a compromise 
amendment form (352 out of 551 amendments). This ratio is even 
higher – 75.5% (247 out of 327) – when the draft report amendments 
are analysed in the final regulations. It means that draft report 
amendments had a higher chance of being adopted in any stage of 
the decision-making – plenary, final regulation – in a compromise 
amendment form. Therefore, it might be supposed that rapporteurs 
deliberately packed a high number of their ‘draft report’ 
amendments in a compromise amendment form to give them a 
greater chance of being adopted.  
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4.3 The relationship between the Parliament plenary 
and COMAGRI 
In this section we analyse how much the Parliament plenary was 
able to influence the final policy outcome and how much the 
Parliament plenary wanted to or could the change the position 
taken by COMAGRI. Table 15.12 contains the success rates of 
amendments in the Parliament plenary-COMAGRI relationship. 
Taking into account the total number of amendments tabled to all 
four CAP regulations, 96.4% of COMAGRI-adopted amendments 
were supported by the Parliament plenary. This figure is 89.2% for 
the Direct Payment Regulation, 99.8% for the SCMO, 98% for 
EAFRD, and 90.5% for the Horizontal Regulation. 
As for the total number of ‘draft report’ amendments, the 
Parliament plenary adopted 98.6% of those adopted by COMAGRI. 
Regarding open amendments, the Parliament plenary adopted 
94.8% of those amendments that were previously adopted by 
COMAGRI. Concerning compromise amendments, the Parliament 
plenary adopted 98.5% of those adopted by COMAGRI.1 As for the 
amendments tabled by the opinion-giving committees, the 
Parliament plenary adopted 98.2% of those adopted previously by 
COMAGRI. 
There were 334 amendments tabled to the Parliament plenary 
session, 47.9% of which were proposed to the SCMO Regulation, 
29.9% to the Direct Payment Regulation, 12.3% to the EAFRD and 
9.9% to the Horizontal Regulation. The Parliament plenary adopted 
6.9% of all plenary amendments. In the final regulations, 3% of all 
plenary amendments can be found. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 For these figures, Compromise amendments are not extracted. 
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Table 15.12 Plenary to COMAGRI success rates by amendment type and 
CAP regulation 
EP plenary-adopted amendments compared to COMAGRI-adopted (in %) 
Amendment type Regulations 
Consultation 
procedure 
2007-13 
2013 CAP 
reform 
Draft report 
amendments 
DP 95.7 88.4 
EAFRD 100 100 
HR 100 96.9 
SCMO 100 100 
Total 97.2 98.6 
Open amendments 
DP 96.6 88.2 
EAFRD 98.3 97.8 
HR 100 86.3 
SCMO 100 99.6 
Total 97.5 94.8 
Compromise 
amendments* 
DP 100 94.6 
EAFRD 100 100 
HR n/a 92.6 
SCMO n/a 100 
Total 100 98.5 
OGC amendments 
DP 42.9 100 
EAFRD 94.7 96.7 
HR 100 100 
SCMO n/a 100 
Total 81.5 98.2 
Total 
DP 95 89.2 
EAFRD 98.1 98 
HR 100 90.5 
SCMO 100 99.8 
Total 96.6 96.4 
Source: Own calculations. 
*All types of amendments are calculated with the extraction of the compromise 
amendments. Success rates of compromise amendments are calculated based 
on their original figures (non-extracted).  
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Table 15.13 The success rates of plenary amendments by CAP regulation 
Regulation 
Consultation procedure 
2007-13 2013 CAP reform 
Number 
of 
plenary 
amend-
ments 
Plenary-
adopted 
(%) 
Final 
regulation 
(%) 
Number 
of 
plenary 
amend-
ments 
Plenary-
adopted 
(%) 
Final 
regulation 
(%) 
DP 53 28.3 3.8 100 4 1 
EAFRD 3 66.7 0 41 22 9.8 
HR 0 0 0 33 21.2 15.2 
SCMO 0 0 0 160 1.9 0 
Total 56 30.4 3.6 334 6.9 3 
Source: Own calculations. 
In this section we can draw three conclusions. First, the 
Parliament plenary largely adopted the COMAGRI position. Only a 
very few number of COMAGRI-adopted amendments have been 
turned down by the Parliament plenary. It appears that the policy 
direction was set by COMAGRI and not by the Parliament plenary. 
Second, the success rates of Parliament plenary amendments are 
very low. It seems to indicate that the Parliament plenary does not 
greatly influence the Parliament’s policy direction. And third, there 
is not a real difference between the co-decision and the consultation 
procedures: first, under both legislative procedures the Parliament 
plenary overwhelmingly adopts the COMAGRI position, and 
second, the success rates of Parliament plenary amendments are 
very low.  
4.4 The role of opinion-giving committees 
There were five opinion giving committees (OGC) tabling 
amendments to the four CAP regulations: BUDG, CONT, DEVE, 
ENVI and REGI. OGCs tabled 533 amendments to the CAP 
regulation, which is 6.2% of the total number of amendments.  
Regarding the total number of amendments tabled by OGCs, 
the calculations show that 10.5% were adopted by COMAGRI and 
10.3% by the Parliament plenary, while 4.3% of the OGC 
amendments were adopted after the trilogue negotiations and 
therefore built into the final regulations. 
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Table 15.14 The numbers and success rates of OGC amendments 
EP 
committee 
Number and 
share of 
amendments 
Success rates - compared to the 
total 
Success 
rates 
Total 
number 
Share 
(%) 
COMAGRI-
adopted (%) 
Plenary-
adopted 
(%) 
Final 
regulation 
(%) 
Final to 
plenary 
(%) 
BUDG 47 8.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 100 
CONT 137 25.7 11.7 11.7 5.8 50 
DEVE 38 7.1 21.1 21.1 13.2 62.5 
ENVI 179 33.6 7.3 6.7 3.4 50  
REGI 132 24.8 13.6 13.6 2.3 16.7 
Total 533 100 10.5 10.3 4.3 41.8 
Source: Own calculations. 
OGCs had the highest influence on the Horizontal Regulation 
with an amendment success rate of 8.3% in the final regulation, 
followed by EAFRD (5.3%). Broken down by OGC, we can see that 
the BUDG committee had the greatest impact – highest adoption 
rate of amendments – on the EAFRD Regulation (4.4%). CONT and 
REGI had the highest level of influence on the Horizontal 
Regulation, with 16.2% and 3.1% of their amendments in the final 
regulation, respectively. DEVE and ENVI were the most influential 
in the EAFRD Regulation, with 38.5% and 4.1% adoption rates, 
respectively. 
We can draw four conclusions regarding the role and 
influence of OGCs in the 2013 CAP reform. First, the most active 
OGC was ENVI, tabling 33.6% of the total number of OGC 
amendments. Second, OGCs in general had minimal influence on 
the final CAP policy outcome: slightly more than 4% of the OGC 
amendments were incorporated in the final CAP regulations. Third, 
DEVE was the most successful OGC, as 13.2% of its amendments 
can be found in the final CAP regulations.2 Finally, OGCs 
                                                        
2 These results should be treated with caution, as 76% of them were 
amendments which had a minor connection to the most sensitive CAP policy 
issues. These amendments mostly contained references to developing or 
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influenced the CAP policy outcome in the Horizontal and EAFRD 
Regulations the most, but had a very minor influence on the Direct 
Payment and SCMO Regulations. 
5. Conclusions 
We investigated the role of the Parliament in the legislative 
procedure after the introduction of the co-decision procedure by 
using the amendment analysis of the CAP reform under two 
subsequent periods. Unlike previous research, ours provided an in-
depth analysis of CAP amendments with two novelties. First, the 
categorisation of Parliament amendments by type, and second, 
analysing the adoption of Parliament amendments in each of the 
three stages of the legislative process. 
The main conclusion of our analysis is that in the 2013 CAP 
reform, almost 60% of Parliament amendments adopted by the 
Parliament plenary were built into the final CAP regulations, 
compared to less than 30% under the consultation procedure. These 
results confirm the findings by Corbett et al. (1995) and Tsebelis et 
al. (2001) that adoption rates of Parliament amendments are higher 
under the co-decision procedure. 
Our results also show that agricultural policy amendments in 
the four CAP regulations have been adopted by the Council at an 
above-average rate (51.2%). These results are in line with the 
findings of Crombez & Swinnen (2011) on the CAP reform that the 
Parliament gains legislative influence in the move from consultation 
to co-decision procedure. Our results also support the conclusions 
of Roederer-Rynning et al. (2012) that the Treaty of Lisbon increased 
the influence of the Parliament in legislative terms in the CAP. 
In the Parliament-Council relationship, with adoption rates of 
Parliament amendments between 50% and 60%, we can conclude 
that the Parliament appears to become a real co-legislator with the 
Council, i.e. if one player in a two-player decision-making process 
manages to make more than 50% of its position adopted by the 
other, it can be fairly considered to be a decision-maker on equal 
footing. In the 2013 CAP reform, more than 50% of the agricultural 
                                                        
third countries, development cooperation or agreements in light of the CAP 
reform.  
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policy amendments and the CAP reform amendments in the 
Parliament negotiation mandate were incorporated in the final 
regulations, which appears to make the Parliament an equal partner 
with the Council during the trilogue negotiations. In general, this 
result reinforces the position of Crombez (1997) and Tsebelis & 
Garrett (2001) that the Parliament became a real co-legislator with 
the Council after the introduction of the co-decision procedure. 
These high adoption rates of Parliament amendments in the final 
regulation also confirm the findings of Steunenberg (1998), namely 
that the final political outcome is closer to the Parliament’s position 
under co-decision.  
The adoption rates of Parliament amendments by type reveal 
our main conclusion: the Parliament appears to act most powerfully 
vis-à-vis the Council regarding compromise amendments (66.3% 
success rate). The adoption rates of compromise amendments are 
the highest compared to any kind of amendment categories. The 
high success rates of compromise as well as draft report 
amendments highlight the key role of rapporteurs, primarily in 
gaining strong political support behind these amendments.  
Regarding the COMAGRI-Parliament plenary relationship 
and the role of the plenary amendments, we see that the Parliament 
plenary predominantly adopted the COMAGRI position. Only a 
very few number of COMAGRI-adopted amendments were turned 
down by the Parliament plenary, while a very few Parliament 
plenary amendments were adopted. It means that the policy 
direction is set by COMAGRI and not by the Parliament plenary. 
This reinforces the conclusion by Neuhold (2001) that the 
Parliament committees are the backbone of the Parliament decision-
making procedure. Our findings also support the findings of 
Yordanova (2010), namely that “when legislative acts are adopted 
in the Parliament plenary…they are largely based on the committee 
reports”.  
Finally, we have shown that the role of OGCs in the 2013 CAP 
reform is very limited. OGC amendments had the lowest level of 
adoption (41.8%) in the 2013 CAP reform. 
This research goes beyond existing literature, by categorising 
the Parliament amendments and analysing the adoption rates of 
amendments in each of the three stages of the legislative process. 
There are conflicting views among scholars of how much the 
408  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY AMENDMENTS TO THE 2013 CAP REFORM 
 
adoption rates of Parliament amendments could be used for 
measuring the legislative influence of the Parliament. This research 
aims to contribute to this debate via a more detailed analysis of 
Parliament amendments. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that without the analysis of 
the content of the amendments, we need to be wary of drawing 
strong conclusions regarding the increase of the legislative power of 
the Parliament. The authors share the view that the Parliament 
managed to increase its legislative influence under the co-decision 
procedure – see Table 15.1 and Roederer-Rynning et al. (2012) – and 
the amendment analysis presented in this chapter appears to 
underpin it in the case of the CAP. 
Future research should focus on analysing the content of 
amendments and weighting them regarding their importance in 
order to provide a more in-depth analysis of the change of the 
legislative influence of the Parliament after the extension of the 
ordinary legislative procedure to the CAP. Also, in order to know 
more about the legislative power of the Parliament, future research 
should place more emphasis on the Parliament-Council relationship 
in the legislative process, by analysing the factors influencing the 
adoption of the Parliament’s policy position – Parliament 
amendments – during the trilogue negotiations. 
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